The Invasion of Ukraine

In 2021 Russia began to amass troops on its border with Ukraine and in Belarus to the north of Kyiv. On 24 February 2022 Russia began what it called a “special operation”, which was in actuality an outright invasion. Putin believed he could occupy Ukraine within just a few days. He did not expect the force of the Ukrainian military resistance or the international condemnation that occurred in response. After all, in 2014, in conjunction with Russian separatist paramilitaries, Putin got away with the annexation of the Crimea and parts of the Ukrainian Donbas. 

Two years on, the war continues unresolved as Ukraine continues to successfully resist occupation. The responsibility for the associated death and destruction lies squarely on the heads of the Russian political leadership. Putin’s Russian nationalist party, United Russia, is the political expression of the Oligarchs, the new capitalist class that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Putin attempted to justify the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a multitude of ways: a ‘necessary‘ move to address the threat posed by NATO; that Russia was ‘reclaiming’ territory from a ‘false’ state; that this action was taken to protect Russian speakers in Ukraine; and claiming the invasion was a benevolent act to “denazify” Ukraine. Russia’s justifications stretched the limits of truth. For example, the significance of Nazi symbols and ideology appears to have been greatly overstated. Senior adviser at Berlin’s Counter Extremism Project (CEP), Alexander Ritzmann, said Ukraine “is not a cesspit for Nazi sympathizers,” but rather, “There is a far-right extremist problem on both sides in the conflict, but there seems to be a bias in only reporting on Ukraine’s far-right problem”. True reasons for invasion are likely to be a combination of imperialist land and resource grabbing, to create a buffer against NATO, and also ‘because he [Putin] feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself.’ And so, as the conflict drags on, and the reasons for invasion have been clearly exposed as falsehoods, we must ask: what now? What of the continued Western supply of ammunition and weapons to Ukraine? What of the resistance within Russia to Putin and warmongering? Where do internationalist socialists stand?

Ukraine has a right to self-determination even though its struggle is being used to strengthen NATO. As Lenin stated in The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses), ‘The fact that the struggle for national liberation against one imperialist power may, under certain circumstances, be utilized by another “Great” Power in its equally imperialist interests’ [should not induce the socialist movement] ‘to renounce its recognition of the right of nations to self-determination … .’

Ukraine has every right to obtain weapons for its defence, whatever the source. NATO supply of munitions to Ukraine has been and remains critical in enabling Ukraine to fend off Russia’s military might. However, military supplies to Ukraine have not been unstinting. They are rationed to the effect that Ukraine is always dependent and the US and NATO can dictate the eventual outcome of the conflict. The US-led Western imperialist bloc is using the war to strengthen its position against Russia, an imperialist rival. Finland’s joining NATO in April 2023 is an example of the military strengthening of the Western imperialist bloc.

As Russia entered the war, thousands of Russians took to the streets to protest. The Russian government was, unfortunately, swift and effective in suppressing such protests: arresting dissenters, cutting access to social media, and forcing the closure of TV channels, radio stations and newspapers. Russian musician and left-wing activist Kirill Medvedev described the government crackdown: ‘The repression now is the most serious in the entire post-Soviet period, and the most absurd. Absurd in its extreme authoritarian nature; and dissenters have thus been driven to a blend of absurd and creative lengths to be able to nonetheless continue to protest: leaving in public places small statuettes holding anti-war messages, holding up blank placards or placards with asterisks which are understood to represent the words “нет войне” (No to War), and hiding protest within the subtext of music lyrics. Resistance has also extended to sabotage such as setting on fire military recruitment offices and military hardware and the disruption of military supply trains, and the distribution of anti-war propaganda under cover of night.’

That Russian anti-war resistance continues is very admirable, but unfortunately resistance has not been widespread enough to stop the war. A significant barrier to working-class mobilisation against Putin is the positive regard in which he is held by many. Putin is believed to have ensured the survival of numerous ‘monogorody’ – towns which are reliant on a single Soviet-era factory – thus providing stability for many working-class people in exchange for political fealty. A developing labour shortage in Russia raises the possibility of increased working-class power, but the working class will need to be organised to effectively direct and realise that power.

There has also been resistance to Putin through the electoral system, although this has also thus far failed on several levels. Over a hundred thousand people provided signatures, as required by Russian law, in support of anti-war politician Boris Nadezhdin’s enrolment as a candidate for the 2024 Russian presidential election. Regardless, Nadezhdin was prevented from candidacy by election authorities who discounted many of those signatures. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny found his bid for the Russian presidency in 2018 similarly thwarted, and was subsequently sentenced to a 19-year prison sentence on charges of “extremism”. Navalny died suddenly in February 2024 while in prison. Strategist for the Navalny campaign, Leonid Volkov, described the then-upcoming March 2024 election as a ‘propaganda effort to spread hopelessness’ amongst Putin’s opponents.

News agency NPR reported: ‘It is highly unlikely that the refusal to register Nadezhdin as a candidate will produce any protests in the streets. Demonstrations have been rare in Russia since February 2022, when antiwar rallies resulted in mass arrests and eventually fizzled. Nadezhdin himself has publicly entertained the idea of calling for protests, but stressed that those would be possible only if the government authorizes them, which it rarely does.’

Independent media reporting has been stifled, and independent observation of the election process disallowed. In occupied Ukraine, voting was held at literal gunpoint. Putin has thus swept to another presidential victory – a victory enabled by legislation Putin enacted in 2021 that extends his eligibility for presidency until 2036. It is clear that Russia is a dictatorship using only the language of democracy.

Ukraine has recently been escalating its attacks on oil refineries and other energy infrastructure inside Russian territory because, apparently, ‘it has become clear there’s no hope for victory [for Ukraine] on the battlefield’. While Russia retaliates in kind, there might be some hope for Ukraine in the gradual demoralisation of the Russian side. The war has apparently become increasingly unpopular with Russian troops, who use social media to share their discontent with tactical direction and high death tolls. Many Russian soldiers have refused to extend their service. These are small but important acts of rebellion against a leadership which would sacrifice them to serve ruling class interests. Although the war drags on, internationalist socialists everywhere must not give up hope for Ukrainian resistance. We must continue to simultaneously express solidarity with Ukrainians for their continued self-defence, while also urging the organised revolt of the Russian working class against their imperialist dictators.

Image: “Anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine (War Ukraine)” by Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0